

























E D I T O R I A L  
The internet was once seen as a new and 
definitive window to freedom and a world 
without torture. There is however, another 
less obvious but perhaps more notorious side: 
torturous environments can also be created 
through the internet; a place where individu-
als may be targeted for discrimination, coer-
cion or control. There is a dearth of academic 
research and theoretical developments in this 
very new area of knowledge and this Edito-
rial will review and reflect on various aspects, 
thereby suggesting possible lines of research.
Searching for definitions
A recent theoretical review in the field of online 
violence (Harris & Woodlock, 2019) with its 
focus on gender, proposed the use of the term 
technology-facilitated coercive control when re-
ferring to abuse using social networks or the 
internet. The authors propose that similar 
denominations are sought for other kinds of 
digital violence and suggest that any denom-
ination of these new phenomena include the 
terms perpetrator and purpose. Other expres-
sions found in the literature include digital coer-
cive control (DCC), technology-facilitated violence 
(TFV), or technology-related violence (Douglas, 
Harris, & Dragiewicz, 2019).
The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime 
Convention Committee has recently defined 
cyberviolence1 as: “the use of computer systems 
to cause, facilitate, or threaten violence against 
individuals that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm 
or suffering and may include the exploitation of 
the individual’s circumstances, characteristics or 
vulnerabilities” (T-CY, 2018), a definition also 
adopted by the European Parliament (Van 
Der Wilk, 2018).
This definition, however, focuses on the 
internet and leaves aside other forms of com-
munication. For the purposes of this editorial, 
we will consider a wider perspective and, mir-
roring the conditions of the UNCAT defini-
tion, consider Internet and Communications 
Ill-Treatment and Torture (ICIT) as those acts 
of violence intentionally committed, instigated or 
aggravated, in part or whole, by the use of in-
formation and communication technologies that 
cause psychological and emotional pain or suf-
fering, for such purposes as obtaining informa-
1  https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/
cyberviolence#{%2250020850%22:[0]}
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 E D I T O R I A L
tion, punishment, intimidation, coercion or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the in-
stigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 
a public official or other person acting in an of-
ficial capacity. 
This is achieved, among other methods, by 
inducing emotional suffering through threats 
and fear, breaking bonds of confidence in the 
targeted person, inducing shame, embarrass-
ment, humiliation or guilt, promoting and 
fostering prejudices and discrimination, dam-
aging reputation, creating conflict with peers, 
fellows, relatives or loved ones or breaking com-
munity ties. The ultimate objective, as in clas-
sical torture, would be to change the identity, 
attitudes or behaviours of the targeted person 
and break their will. These are working defini-
tions that need to mature further, as research 
and knowledge develops.
A particular challenge relates to the role of 
the state in ICIT. Indeed, a state’s passivity or 
lack of due diligence, when acting against re-
curring and known patterns of digital violence, 
especially those affecting socially discriminated 
groups such as women or social or political-
ly-motivated activists, facilitates ICIT’s align-
ment with the classic definition of torture or 
ill-treatment. In her 2018 report, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the issue of vi-
olence, its causes and consequences, stated that 
the duty of due diligence to prevent, investigate 
and punish sexist violence, extends to the digital 
world (UN Human Rights Council, 2018).
Medical and Psychological Impacts.
Although there are no studies on the level 
of psychological pain that ICIT can entail, 
future studies in this new field must consider 
at least three sources of suffering: (a) direct 
effects: fear, shame, guilt, helplessness or rage, 
leading to anxiety, depressive or somatisation 
disorders (b) indirect effects: the cognitive 
and emotional burden of being forced to 
devote time and energy to prevent and coun-
teract such acts (i.e. to defend reputation pub-
licly, assess danger and implement eventual 
security measures or to try to circumvent sur-
veillance and control) (c) psychosocial effects: 
impact on family, interpersonal relationships, 
workplace and social networks (i.e fear, de-
tachment, polarisation, rumour spreading…).
The closest reference in academia is cyber-
bullying2, and digital dating abuse3, although 
the severity of threats, danger and degradation 
is not comparable to that of ICIT and there is 
no consensus on the role of the state. A recent 
European Transnational Study with more than 
5000 respondents found three profiles of emo-
tional consequences: 5% of teenagers showed 
severe emotional damage to cyberbullying in-
cluding suicidal tendencies; for 75% of teenag-
ers, there were moderate symptoms of anxiety 
or depression that disappeared with time and 
20% cyberbullying had no major impact on 
them (Ortega et al., 2012). A review of the 
specific relationship between suicide attitudes 
and cyberbullying using studies from 1997 to 
2018, found that those who experience cyber 
victimisation are at two to three times more 
risk of committing suicide4 depending on 
personal and social vulnerability factors that 
themselves would necessitate further explo-
ration (John et al., 2018). Although these are 
2 There is no consensual definition of bullying and 
cyberbullying. For a review of definitions see 
Gleeson (2014). Bullying is defined as ongoing 
harmful behaviour in relationships with power 
disparities. Cyberbullying is referred to the use of 
communication technologies for bullying.
3 Digital dating abuse is defined as the use of 
verbal, physical and sexual aggression by an intimate 
partner.
4 OR 2.35 (95% CI 1.65-3.34) times as likely to self-
harm, OR 2.10 (95% CI 1.73-2.55) times as likely 
to exhibit suicidal behaviors and OR 2.57 (95% CI 


























E D I T O R I A L  
indirect data obtained from a population com-
prising different ages and in different contexts, 
it highlights the immense mental suffering that 
Internet and Communications Ill-treatment 
and Torture can entail. 
Certain organisations track internet-related 
violence specifically as a form of gender-based 
violence (Barrera & Rodríguez, 2017; Serra, 
2018; Van Der Wilk, 2018). Especially relevant 
is the work of Colectivo Luchadoras (“Fight-
ers Collective”) from Mexico (Barrera & Ro-
dríguez, 2017); a feminist group that has 
collected and analysed hundreds of internet 
incidents and propose 13 categories that could 
serve as a good point of departure for the ac-
ademic study of ICIT (table 1).
There is also a similar classification de-
veloped by the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF, 2015). 
Summarising table 1, the Internet Gover-
nance Forum and the Council of Europe doc-
uments, we can consider four main situations: 
(a) Coercion, threats, and intimidation; (b) Sur-
veillance, monitoring, and control in real-time; 
(c) Theft of sensitive information; (d) Defama-
tion and public degradation. 
In terms of analysis, and from a psycho-
logical perspective, conditions (a) and (b) are 
fear-producing actions, and (c) and (d) target 
identity. 
Essential elements to understand Internet 
and Communications related-violence as 
ill-treatment or torture.
We have defined internet related violence. 
Now, we turn to the subject that suffers this 
violence and to a new phenomen: the difficult 
to define new identities.
Internet-based identities. 
ICIT has peculiar characteristics that derive 
from attacks on new forms of identity created 
through the internet, the exact definition of 
which is still subject to debate. Digital iden-
tity is defined as that which a person creates 
on the internet by constructing a way of pre-
senting him or herself in the virtual commu-
nity (Gonzales & Hancock, 2011). A related 
concept is Information Technology (IT) identity, 
as the extent to which an individual views IT 
as integral of a person’s sense of self -as both 
a new type of material identity and an integral 
part of the self (Carter & Grover, 2015). There 
is however, an even more under-researched 
identity: the identity that others (including the 
state) create of us. When others (including the 
state) create and spread information about us, 
inaccuracies blend seamlessly with the truth, 
the totality of these elements making up the 
image others have of us (our “digital iden-
tity”). Anyone carrying out a web search will be 
unable to distinguish true elements from those 
that may be defamatory and will likely make 
conclusions based on the totality of what is 
found. Our digital identity is, as a result, almost 
impossible to control. The higher the levels of 
exposure, the higher the risks of losing control. 
It is not surprising that those growing up in the 
era of new technologies, who are much more 
conscious of their new digital identity, devote 
time to carefully construct their digital self. 
Furthermore, amongst consistent users 
of social networks (as is the case with many 
human rights activists), there is a dialogical 
effect: the internet constitutes a distinctive 
“looking glass” that modifies one’s identity 
(Zhao, 2005) and research shows that the 
more it is used, the more vulnerable a person 
is to what others say about them (Manago, 
2014). Stigma in the form of a permanent 
digital footprint is arguably more difficult 
than ever to escape. The internet has become 
a digital prison (Lageson & Maruna, 2018) 
by producing a lasting mark of shame through 
messages, comments, videos and/or pictures. 
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Table 1. Mapping Internet and Communications attacks
1. Unauthorised access (tapping) and monitoring access. Password theft, spyware; intervention/
tapping devices; equipment theft; locking user access; phishing1, virus infection; key loggers2.
2. Control and manipulation of personal information. Deleting, changing or falsifying personal 
data (photo or video); taking photos or video without consent (not necessarily with sexual content); 
controlling accounts on digital platforms.
3. Spoofing and Identity Theft. Creation of false profiles or accounts; usurpation of a personal 
website with name or data referring to the individual; impersonating an individual , including using 
your account to communicate; theft of identity, money or property.
4. Monitoring and Cyberstalking. Surveillance or hidden cameras, location identification employing 
images; geolocation on equipment /cellular or notifications; cyberfollowing; cyberstalking3.
5. Discriminatory statements. Abusive comments; discrimination against various groups, electronic 
insults; discriminatory media coverage.
6. Harassment. Stalking; waves of group insults; messages from strangers; repeated messages; sending 
unsolicited sexual pictures.
7. Threats. Messages, images or videos with threats of physical or sexual violence
8. Dissemination of personal or intimate information without consent. Sharing private informa-
tion (doxxing4); exposure of sexual identity or preference that generates risk (outing); dissemination 
of intimate or sexual content without consent; disclosure of privacy.
9. Blackmail. Sextorsion5.
10. Discrediting. Dissemination of content; smear campaigns; defamation; disqualification.
11. Technology-related sexual abuse and exploitation. Deceiving for purposes of trafficking; sexual 
abuse; grooming6.
12. Attacks to channels of expression. Removal of profiles or pages on social networks; DDOS 
attacks7; restrictions of use domain; domain theft; blackouts (from the state or company) during a 
meeting or protest or from a provider
13. Omissions by actors with regulatory power. Lack of regulation or implementation of protection 
measures related to messages, images or videos with threats of physical or sexual violence.
1 A technique that seeks to trick people into infecting and/or stealing information from a digital device.
2 Keylogg: Software or hardware that can intercept and save keystrokes on the keyboard of an infected computer.
3 The use of digital technology devices, or online activity, to monitor a person and to use the information 
harvested to harass or intimidate him or her online, to monitor his or her physical movements, or to capture 
him or her at a specific geographical location.
4 Doxxing: An abbreviation of the phrase "dropping docs," which refers to the act of sharing someone's 
personal details with others online, in particular a physical address or personal identification documents, 
such as a form of bullying or harassment.
5 Sextorsion: The use of intimate images or personal information as a form of coercion for sexual exploitation 
or blackmail
6 Grooming: The use of social networks to deliberately cultivate an emotional connection with minors for the 
purpose of sexual abuse or exploitation
7 DDOS attack: DDoS- Distributed Denial of Service – a malicious attempt to create massive traffic, 
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Internet and Communications Ill-treatment 
and Torture aims to provoke silence (Basak et 
al., 2019), but psychological and psychosocial 
mechanisms that operate between victims and 
perpetrators and between both and the wider 
digital community is also a field of academic re-
search in its infancy. Anonymity and the search 
for popularity play a hitherto mediational role 
in these mechanisms. As an example, a recent 
study showed that a vast majority of shamers on 
Twitter shamed the victim and not the perpe-
trator. Shamers’ follower counts also were seen 
to increase faster than that of the non-shamers, 
showing that shamers could easily be enticed 
to do so if their actions are validated by others 
(Basak et al., 2019). The mechanisms operat-
ing in the physical world are not the same that 
operate in the digital world. This was seen in a 
visionary manner by Guy Debord (1967/1995) 
in The Society for Spectacle, a book written before 
the digital era but essential to understanding 
some of the paradoxical destructive dynamics 
of the digital world.
Physical world
Outside of the context of the internet, the chal-
lenges are also vast. We live in what has been 
labelled a “post-privacy” world (Busch, 2019). 
Human beings are permanently exposed to 
scrutiny. Computers record personal inter-
ests, searches, purchases, sexual perversions or 
political ideology; gadgets capable of playing 
music and informing us of the weather are also 
capable of informing others of our preferences 
and conversations; phone applications access 
our photographs and videos; GPS and cameras 
inform on who we are and where we are; surveil-
lance cameras in streets, banks and buildings 
can trace our paths and who we talk to or even 
what we say; credit cards and shopping apps 
record our steps and our tastes, while aerial 
cameras and drones allow tracking of individu-
als even in the middle of crowds. No news or 
event takes place, even in the most remote of 
places that is not recorded on smartphones, 
uploaded and viewed worldwide within a few 
hours, while Periscope, Instagram or Facebook 
also broadcast our lives. This is part of what big 
data analytics will provide to governments and 
private companies. It can however, also be used 
against individuals. 
The power of big data analytics for social 
control is exemplified by the recent scandal in-
volving the use of millions of Facebook pro-
files by Cambridge Analytica in London, to 
create psychological clusters of voters that 
were latterly used to further Donald Trump 
campaign1. Linked to this is the new academic 
branch of neuro-politics that studies how to 
control and direct voters by studying public 
and private brain responses to political stimuli 
(Rose & Abi-Rached, 2014; Schreiber, 2017). 
Torture and ICIT 
From a moral and ethical point of view, torture 
is defined relationally. It is grounded in con-
cepts of autonomy, control, and free will. For 
philosophers and specialists in ethics, torture 
is a relationship between two human beings 
characterised by a violation of dignity and un-
derstood as a lack of recognition and respect, 
and a violation of autonomy, expressed by the 
absolute power, control and imposition of the 
will of the perpetrator, and the lack of control, 
powerlessness and suppression of the free will 
of the victim (Koenig, 2013; Luban, 2009; 
Maier, 2011; Parry, 2003; Pollmann, 2011; 
Scarry, 1985; Sussman, 2006). 
When developing the idea of torture as 
related to dignity and humiliation, and the ab-
solute repression of free will, most philosophers 
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perpetrator and victim. The torturer aims to 
break the victim by, among other elements, at-
tacking the victim’s identity through fear and 
humiliation, which in turn produces emotional 
pain and suffering. In psychiatry however, hu-
miliation is conceptualised as an interpersonal 
emotion. Torture survivors often have long-last-
ing feelings of humiliation and can perfectly 
recall the event or series of events when this 
humiliation was provoked by the perpetrator(s) 
and indelibly engraved in their memory. 
Internet and communications-related vio-
lence acts exactly on these same two essential 
points, but with very particular distinctions.
1. Fear is unspecific. For the psychological 
study of fear as an emotion, there are 
two very distinct phenomena. Fears that 
are related to concrete and visible threats 
(i.e. an animal attacking the person) and 
fears related to invisible, unpredictable 
or unknown threats (i.e being confined 
in a dark place). While visible and pre-
dictable threats allow for some sense of 
control, invisible and unknown threats 
induce helplessness and despair (Hopper 
& Hidalgo, 2006; Phillips, 2011). ICIT 
is a modality of torture that (a) does not 
require the physical presence of a perpe-
trator, and in which (b) the perpetrator is 
quite often anonymous or behind a hidden 
or false identity2. Furthermore, both ele-
ments make it more difficult to demon-
2  As a side note, according to Douglas, Harris, & 
Dragiewicz (2019), to understand the emotional 
suffering of internet-related violence, the most 
essential variable is Spatiality. In their view 
the experiences of, risk and mental health 
consequences faced by victim/survivors in 
regional, rural and remote locations or where the 
perpetrator might physically reach the person are 
entirely different from pure on-line threats and 
must be studied separately. 
strate the link of the perpetrator with state 
actors or to make evident the political or 
discriminatory purpose of the threat.
2. Shame instead of humiliation. While humil-
iation happens in a private space between 
two persons or between a person and a 
small group of perpetrators, broadcasting 
through social networks means that the 
attack on an individual’s identity happens 
in the public sphere, and is thus amplified 
and prolonged endlessly by the almost 
infinite memory of internet search engines 
(Hodalska, 2019). It is this condition of 
public debasement that makes shame, and 
not humiliation, the core emotion. From 
a psychological point of view, shame is 
more damaging and produces more pain 
and suffering than humiliation. While 
humiliation drives to action towards the 
perpetrator (rage, pursue of justice, some-
times desire of revenge), shame is usually 
linked to inhibition, paralysis, powerless-
ness, helplessness, avoidance of exposure 
and the desire to hide and disappear 
(Leary & Tangney, 2012). 
3. Cruelty. Studies in social psychology show 
that the two most accurate predictors of 
cruelty in perpetrators are anonymity and 
impunity (Anderson & Carnegey, 2004). 
Experimental models show that when per-
petrators are able to act without revealing 
their identity, they choose the most cruel 
actions possible. The same occurs when 
perpetrators can act with impunity and 
where retaliation is impossible. Cruelty 
is also further facilitated by the way that 
interaction takes place on social media and 
by the design and format of communica-
tion, such as limitations to the number of 
characters in posts that tends to provoke 
brief insulting messages.
4. Mediated interaction. If the purpose of 
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essential to be able to see the impact of 
torture on the victim directly. In ICIT, 
quite often, there is an inability to see a vic-
tim’s reaction (i.e. regarding threats to life). 
This can either protect the victim or trigger 
escalation. But there are also contexts in 
which visibility is clear and immediate; the 
victim’s reaction is especially visible on the 
internet either through the violence that 
the victim explicitly shows as a reaction, 
or because the Internet community can 
perceive that the person attacked reduces 
online presence, maintains a “low profile”, 
avoids interacting with certain profiles, 
loses followers or begins to be targeted by 
more and more parties.
5. Permanent stress. In ICIT, the perpetrator 
often has 24 hours uninterrupted access 
to the victim. The victim may engage 
in frequent checking behaviours with 
exponential anxiety and feelings of fear. 
Furthermore, each time violent or contro-
versial content is reactivated, the trauma 
is also reactivated. Not knowing when the 
controversy may be revived generates a 
great deal of helplessness and a sense of 
vulnerability. It may also occur at a time 
when the victim is ill, emotionally fragile 
or facing other personal challenges, or 
equally at a time of professional growth 
that may suffer detriment as a result.
6. Multiplicity of aggressors. The impact of 
digital violence often does not originate 
from a single source. Instead, we witness 
either a snowball phenomenon with the 
multiplication of an initial violent content, 
or an organised collective attack in which 
the victim is confronted with the ripple 
effect of being violently targeted from dif-
ferent online profiles, at the same time and 
for the same reason. These two dynamics 
increase the feeling of helplessness, the 
inability to activate personal resources and 
the loss of self-esteem to the extent that 
it may irreversibly damage self-perception 
and identity.
These are six very specific and peculiar el-
ements that make ICIT a condition liable to 
produce very severe pain or suffering, deserv-
ing specific studies from academia that have, 
at the time of writing, not yet been explored. 
From theory to practice: ICIT cases 
Threats and punishment
A nurse works in the health center of a rural 
community or a peripheral neighborhood. She 
provides clinical care to everybody in her com-
munity, including injured demonstrators who 
are participating in protests against the gov-
ernment. Some of her neighbours whose ide-
ology aligns with the government inform the 
authorities, and she is, sometime in the future, 
made redundant by her employer. The govern-
ment - like most current governments - has an 
agency that specialises in network monitor-
ing and control. They soon find her presence 
on Facebook and in WhatsApp groups that 
disseminate, among other things, news they 
deem to be anti-government. She is thus put 
on a blacklist and considered an enemy of the 
state. Using false or anonymous IP addresses, 
the government agency floods other social 
networks connected to her (in particular her 
Twitter and Facebook family contacts), and 
networks akin to the government with mes-
sages that present her as a terrorist, as an anti-
patriot and a danger to the community. They 
also reveal information to the media of an in-
timate or deeply humiliating nature from her 
time at university; something she thought that 
belonged to the past. The message is widely 
distributed and includes photos in which she is 
easily recognisable. A photo collage makes her 
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she is not. As a consequence, pro-government 
groups begin to harass her, both inside and out 
of her new workplace through threats, insults 
or paintings on walls reproducing Twitter mes-
sages. She is terrorised, and despite her initial 
resistance and her efforts to delete all her social 
media accounts, the campaign becomes wide-
spread and all her family and peers circles take 
positions on what they understand to be her 
ideological and personal viewpoints. She soon 
begins to think that there is a risk of direct 
physical aggression by organised groups, and 
eventual arrest by authorities. She is recognised 
by some patients in her new workplace, and in-
ternet messages spread information about the 
place where she is now employed. There are 
letters of complaint and finally the private insti-
tution where she works, decides to avoid public 
image problems and eventual problems with 
the government and makes her redundant. 
Emotionally exhausted, she does not know 
what do, and enters into a depressive state with 
a mixture of real and overvalued symptoms of 
persecution: it is impossible to distinguish, for 
her, true and imaginary danger. Countering the 
social media campaign is extremely complex. 
She first decides to restrict her movements to a 
minimum and stay at home except for essential 
trips outside. After some time, she moves to a 
different town. Shortly after, when she also re-
ceives death threats through phone messages in 
her new location, she takes the painful decision 
to go into exile. 
This case is not fictitious. She is “H,” a 
nurse working in Nicaragua. Many more 
cases of a similar nature are reported in other 
countries, especially concerning journalists3 




also normal citizens who are not even involved 
in political activities and are simply carrying 
out their jobs. H never saw her aggressor and 
never knew the true nature of the danger she 
faced. She was publicly accused, mocked and 
debased and was unable to identify the origin 
of the violence. There was effectively no need 
even to detain her, to produce severe psycho-
logical pain or suffering and to intimidate and 
coerce her. 
A recent case study in Indonesia, Colom-
bia, and Kenya (NDI, 2019) identified the 
widespread practice of hate speech, embarrass-
ment and reputational risk, physical threats, 
and sexualised distortion of content targeting 
women activists, as dominant forms of threats 
and punishment.
Between December 2016 and March 
2018, Amnesty International (AI) con-
ducted qualitative and quantitative research 
on women’s experiences of threats, violence, 
and abuse on Twitter. Their poll in 8 coun-
tries interviewed women and non-gender 
binary individuals (Dhrodia, 2018). The re-
search highlighted the particular experiences 
of women of colour, women from ethnic or re-
ligious minorities, lesbian, bisexual or trans-
gender women, non-binary individuals, and 
women with disabilities, to demonstrate the 
intersectional nature of threats, debasement, 
and abuse (Amnesty International, 2018). The 
research found that women, more often than 
men, were the target of threats of murder, 
rape, physical violence and graphic imagery 
via email, comment sections of newspapers 
and across all social media. As of 16 March 
2018, Amnesty International had met with 
the Twitter CEO on three separate occasions 
to obtain a clear policy from the site, and, at 
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ceiving a satisfactory answer. There has been 
some progress since then4.
On 27 January 2017, Ugandan human 
rights activist, Dr. Stella Nyanzi, wrote a 
post on Facebook in which she dubbed 
the Ugandan president ‘a pair of buttocks’ 
(Rukundo, 2018). The message was widely re-
produced and as a consequence, she was then 
subjected to various forms of public internet 
threats by state agents that limited her activ-
ity. In spite of that, the threats culminated in 
her arrest on 7 April 2017. She was charged 
with cyber harassment and offensive commu-
nication contrary to sections 24 and 25 of 
the Ugandan Computer Misuse Act (CMA), 
which is vague legislation developed to restrict 
freedom of expression and political dissidence 
in the country. She was sentenced and jailed. 
ICIT: Shame
Nelson Julio Alvarez, known as Nexy J. Show, 
a Cuban LGBTIQ activist and YouTuber, was 
detained by the Cuban Security Services, who 
seized his digital devices including his com-
puter and mobile phone. During the weeks 
that followed, they replaced his identity on 
social networks for the purpose of public 
denigration5. Ezequiel Fuentes, another 
Cuban LGBTIQ cyber activist on Facebook 
was also the target of a widespread defama-
tion campaign in which alleged members 
of, or collaborators with, the Ministry of the 
Interior publicly revealed private informa-
tion including his relationships, as well as his 








identity theft and humiliation and Fuentes 
through defamation. Both were painfully 
forced to reduce their online presence.
In an interview, UK journalist Nosheen 
Iqbal, often the target of internet attacks, em-
phasised the role of “followers” in internet vi-
olence; an uncritical mass of people who are 
ready to denigrate a person and reproduce the 
attitude of very aggressive ideological opinion 
makers. After writing opinion pieces, Iqbal ex-
perienced systematically that after certain in-
dividuals made deeply offensive comments in 
the mass media, swaths of others followed in 
what seemed to be a well-orchestrated strat-
egy (Mijatovic, 2018).
Threats, shame and post-truth 
environments
Freedom on the Net is an international da-
tabase that collates and analyses situations of 
manipulation of news fora, opinion groups, 
harassment and online attacks on human 
rights defenders. Their reports include a long 
list of countries that infiltrate so-called trolls7 
in discussion forums to manipulate and direct 
their content. Venezuela, the Philippines and 
Turkey are relevant examples among 30 
countries where governments were found to 
employ armies of “opinion shapers” to create 
hegemony for government-supported view-
points, drive particular agendas, and counter 
government critics on social media (Freedom 
House, 2017). In Turkey, for instance, the 
report describes AK Troller, or White Trolls, 
a group pertaining to the ruling Justice and 
7  On the Internet a ‘troll’ or ‘hater’ is a user 
who intentionally seeks to provoke, offend or 
impoverish the conversation within an online 
community, such as a blog, forum or social 
network profile. See also the discussion on 
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Development Party and which is govern-
ment funded. Some 6,000 people have alleg-
edly been recruited by the party to monitor 
and manipulate discussions, drive specific 
agendas, and counter government opponents 
on social media (Freedom House, 2017). 
These organised groups create fake news 
that are accepted  in an uncontested way by an 
often uncritical mass of the population (Lazer et 
al., 2018). Such widespread situations of creat-
ing parallel worlds have given rise to a new field 
of knowledge in social psychology and sociol-
ogy: post-truth environments or a post-truth society. 
These are defined as contexts in which people 
are more likely to accept arguments based on 
emotions and beliefs rather than those based 
on facts (Bunce, 2019; Harsin & Harsin, 2018). 
Lies and falsehoods or manipulated statistics 
are easily accepted by public opinion in as much 
as they support the desired emotions. A person 
or an organisation can be the target of a post-
truth emotional environment. Internet follow-
ers can, in the same way, react to emotional 
slogans in environments of political polarisa-
tion without further reflection.
On the peripheries of torture: controlling 
human beings through the net
Until this point, we have described elements 
of the psychological foundations of internet 
and communications ill-treatment or torture, 
with various examples. The internet is about 
empowering individuals by providing access 
to information. At the same time however, it 
is becoming more and more a place where 
both state and private companies alike gather 
personal information that can potentially be 
used for intimidation and control, including 
surveillance of movements, acts and opinions. 
This can be linked, as far as the individual is 
aware, to the production of emotional suffer-
ing or pain for the purposes suggested by the 
Convention against Torture. We will review 
some of these additional facets in the second 
part of the paper.
Surveillance and control of human right 
groups and political activists
The European Court of Human Rights recently 
published a Fact Sheet on Mass Surveillance8 
with case law from Germany, UK, Russia and 
Hungary among other countries (ECtHR, 
2019). They were selected relevant cases that 
violated Article 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life, home and correspondence) of 
the European Convention, including the Big 
Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15) after 
the revelations by Edward Snowden regarding 
programmes of surveillance and intelligence 
sharing between the USA and the United 
Kingdom. The case concerned three types of 
surveillance conducted by the Government 
Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, 
Britain’s signals-intelligence agency: (a) bulk 
interception of communications under the 
TEMPORA program; (b) intelligence sharing 
and receipt in collaboration with the PRISM 
and Upstream programs run by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and (c) the obtaining 
of communications data from service provid-
ers. It was the first ruling against Britain’s 
mass-surveillance programmes since Edward 
Snowden’s 2013 revelations9.
Russia is an example of a country where 
internet usage is under full control by the 
state and surveillance is widespread. All cryp-
tographic systems except those licensed by the 
Federal Security Service of the Russian Feder-
ation (FSB) are forbidden. All internet provid-
8 https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Mass_
surveillance_ENG.pdf
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ers must install a software named SORM that 
allows filtering and remote control of internet 
traffic10. A special unit of the Secret Services 
is devoted to surveillance and internet control 
(HRW, 2017). In September 2017, WikiLeaks 
released “Spy Files Russia,” confirming how 
state entities had full access to detailed data 
on Russian internet and cellphone users by 
its citizens as part of SORM11. Amongst 
many examples, when the Crimean journalist 
Mykola Semena was detained and sentenced 
for crimes against the state, the Russian Secret 
Service had full control over his computer.12
The British organisation Privacy Interna-
tional maintains a database and updated in-
formation on the systems of surveillance and 
control of groups and activists in different coun-
tries of the world13 including persons from the 
anti-torture movement. It also maintains a 
Surveillance Industry Index14 with detailed in-
formation of hundreds of companies offering 
internet monitoring and surveillance services to 
governments, armies, military institutions, and 
private companies. Many of their activities are 
manifestly illegal and target the control of and 
threat to citizens, and especially political dissi-
dents and human rights activists.
The United States Federal Bureau of In-
vestigations (FBI) uses control and monitoring 
mass surveillance systems. A report by Privacy 
International (2018) has documented infiltra-
tion and troll activities in the Facebook an-
ti-torture group Mass Action Against Police 
Brutality. Privacy International also revealed 








social networks of peaceful climate change ac-
tivists which includes both names and other 
personal data15. 
A recently leaked document published 
in US newspapers showed the existence of a 
secret database shared by different US security 
agencies to track activists, lawyers and human 
rights defenders travelling to the Mexico-USA 
border to help migrants16. Furthermore, Look-
ingGlass Cyber Solutions, a private company 
hired by US Homeland Security gathered per-
sonal information on the internet of around 600 
persons who had participated in demonstra-
tions against Trump’s migrant family separation 
process in 201817, a US practice that is consid-
ered by some scholars as torture (Gray, 2019). 
The Israel based company Cellebrite offers 
the Universal Forensic Extraction Device 
(UFED) designed to retrieve chat logs, texts, 
and other data from phones, in some cases by-
passing PIN codes or passwords18. A recent 
report19 showed, for instance, its use in ex-
tracting information from Mohammed al-Sin-
gace, a Bahraini political activist who was later 
detained and tortured in custody. Cellebrite 
offers, among other services to governments, 
the tracking of phone cells of asylum seekers 
to obtain information, through their GPS 
records, regarding which countries they have 
visited since leaving their countries of origin 
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based on this data. According to journalist re-
search, many European countries, including 
Germany, the UK and Austria use Cellebrite 
services as evidence to deport migrants20. 
A well-known case of surveillance software 
usage is that of Pegasus21, the programme that 
came to light when R3D, a Mexican human 
rights organisation protecting freedom of ex-
pression discovered its systematic use by the 
government to spy on journalists and activists 
who were later targeted, some of them suffer-
ing threats, defamation, kidnapping or torture 
(R3D, 2017). The software consists of malware 
that infects Apple iPhones through a WhatsApp 
message or a failed phone call. The attacker 
has access to everything in the victim’s device: 
email, messaging services, camera, and micro-
phone. The software is manufactured by the 
Israeli company, NSO Group. On its website22 
the company claims to sell the tool exclusively 
to governments on the condition that it is only 
used “to combat terrorists” and notes that the 
software has saved “thousands of lives.” The 
software is sold also to private companies and 
contractors through reseller companies such as 
Hacking Team. According to R3D, the govern-
ment is billed around 75,000 euros per success-
fully controlled telephone. A report by the Red 
en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (Network 
for the Defense of Digital Rights) evidenced 
that the software was acquired by the Mexican 
Army in 2012 and by the office of the Attorney 
General (PGR) in 2014. An impressive series of 
studies show how the use of Pegasus has been 
an essential element in the murdering of jour-
nalists and for targeting politicians, lawyers and 






A research center, Citizen Lab24 based at 
the University of Toronto, produces regular 
reports and provides advice against such prac-
tices. It has detected the use of Pegasus in 45 
countries and other similar software in almost 
all countries25. 
Social control of population 
Although beyond the scope of this review, we 
would also at least mention the three most 
well- known methods of social control of 
the population amongst those of which civil 
society groups are aware. 
• International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI) Catchers. This is a device that con-
nects to mobile phones in a particular area 
and can, among other things, provide the 
exact location of the user, build a network 
of all the numbers with which the person 
makes contact, as well as the successive con-
tacts of those contacts; block or intercept 
data; access the content of calls, text mes-
sages and web sites visited or send intimi-
dating anonymous messages to other mobile 




25 Hacking Team owns another malware, also 
allegedly to detect terrorists, that, according 
to an exhaustive report by Derechos Digitales 
is employed by almost all governments in 
Latin America to control political opponents, 
journalists and human right defenders (Perez 
de Acha, 2016). The report considers that 
such software has spread rapidly because 
secret services from governments in the region 
have cooperation programs and share both 
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are different free mobile apps that allegedly 
detect IMSI catchers.
• Facial recognition systems. These capture de-
tailed images of the participants in meetings or 
demonstrations with high-resolution cameras 
located in very distant places or inside drones. 
These are compared by the police with pho-
tographs of citizens and cross-referenced with 
databases to identify individuals of concern. 
Its use is being questioned by civil society or-
ganisations (Ruhrmann, 2019) and it seems 
there are plans for a European Union strict 
regulation27. In a counter-response effort, the 
Center for Human Rights Science at Carn-
egie Mellon University has developed a tool 
that can collate video recordings made with 
smartphones by demonstrators to produce an 
account of police brutality (Aronson, Cole, 
Hauptmann, Miller, & Samuels, 2018). Dif-
ferent governments have counter-reacted 
with legislation that forbids the use of smart-
phones during demonstrations and imposes 
severe fines if police are recorded, including 
confiscation of the phone28.
• Social media intelligence - often shortened to 
SOCMINT - refers to the massive monitoring 
and gathering of information posted on social 
media platforms. These are software systems 
that are capable of downloading an entire 
website, forum or communications within a 
group, monitoring a citizen’s social networks 
and accumulating evidence against them. 
In June 2019, in Egypt, amid  the most 
repressive period for decades, the govern-
ment-linked El Watan newspaper published 
a leaked Interior Ministry tender document 




the development of an open-source intelli-
gence system called the “Social Networks Se-
curity Hazard Monitoring System.” It would 
monitor Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and 
Viber in real-time for usage that might “harm 
public security or incite terrorism.” It would also 
screen content for “vocabulary which is con-
trary to law and public morality.” According 
to Wikithawra29, an independent monitoring 
group, at least 76 people have been detained 
so far this year in Egypt for offenses related 
to “online publishing.”30
Such great interest in controlling users 
via the internet is not surprising. For certain 
authors, the so-called Arab Spring is an inter-
net-based movement lead by a new young gen-
eration (Cole, 2014). Egypt, Tunisia and Libya 
were, amongst others, examples of countries 
where new technologies harnessed the inter-
net to organise nationwide protests on desig-
nated days and to delegitimise the regime with 
videos of police torture and exposing govern-
ment corruption31. The murder of Khaled Said 
in Alexandria, after he was beaten to death in 
public, by plain-clothes police officers, in front 
of witnesses, is a good example. Autopsy pho-
tographs of his badly battered face were circu-
lated immediately on the internet, provoking 
both widespread demonstrations and vigils – 
many of which were organised and announced 
on Facebook and Twitter. The Facebook group 
“We are all Khalid Said” later became a hub 







32 There is there a complex double-sword: internet 
can help in the fight for freedom, but it is at 
cost of enormous risks for those involved. 
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Broadcasting torture to produce collective 
fear and terror
Occupy Paedophilia is the name given to groups 
of ultra-nationalist Russian neo-Nazi youths 
who have made a name for themselves by 
publishing videos in which they torture young 
members of the LGBTI community. The 
groups use targeted dating apps to organise 
meetings with individuals under the pretense 
of a “date,” who are then filmed while being 
humiliated and beaten. At least in one case, 
the torture ended in death. In mid-2013, the 
first videos and photos began to appear on 
YouTube and the social network VK.com, a 
Russian equivalent to Facebook. The members 
use VK to create cells. At its highest peak, there 
were around 500 cells of 8 to 10 members, dis-
tributed in cities all around Russia. Although 
their stated goal is to locate paedophiles, the 
videos of the victims are of LGBTI teenagers 
or young adults, who are tortured and beaten, 
and during which their sexual orientation or 
gender identity is revealed to family, friends and 
their wider communities. For several years, the 
Russian state, which had enacted several laws 
against so-called “gay propaganda,” did not 
act against them despite having their members 
identified and appearing in newspapers and 
TV, providing relative impunity for these acts 
(Wilkinson, 2014). It was also coincident with 
Russia’s actions at the Human Rights Council 
in pushing for a wide margin of appreciation 
when dealing with “traditional values.” A group 
that imitated Occupy Paedophilia was created 
in Barcelona in 2013. In December 2019, its 
were organized via a Facebook page. All the 
organizers were detained just three days later 
and all followers were tracked, and many of them 
detained or interrogated. Not being part of these 
groups means not having access to information 
on when and where actions would take place, but 
accessing them presented high risk for detention, 
interrogation and torture (Tufekci, 2014). 
members were convicted of a crime against 
moral integrity and disclosure of secrets with 
aggravating circumstances of superiority and 
homophobia, after they had orchestrated meet-
ings with gay men through dating apps with 
pretenses of romance or sexual intentions. 
Instead, the group collectively ambushed their 
targets in order to humiliate them, record their 
actions and spread videos publicly. In 2018, 
Sudan’s security services tried to undermine 
growing popular protests by apprehending a 
group of students in Darfur, torturing them 
brutally until some “admitted” to producing 
bombs to pursue violent intent in the name of 
militia groups in Darfur, and spreading false 
confession video-recordings on Facebook and 
state television (Carmichael & Pinnell, 2019). 
Contrary to what was expected, however, this 
attempt to create a post-truth situation lead 
to a popular reaction. Facebook comments 
disputing the validity of the confessions went 
viral and fuelled protests. Social media posts 
bearing the hashtag #WeAreAllDarfur were 
shared thousands of times (Carmichael & 
Pinnell, 2019).
Legal initiatives to prevent and act against 
ICIT
In July 2018, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council approved a resolution on The 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human 
rights on the Internet through which it encour-
aged State Parties to legislate on how to protect 
freedom in the net while at the same respond-
ing to global threats33. Two years prior, in 2016, 
the European Union institutions succeeded in 
forcing internet giants Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter, Microsoft, and more recently Insta-
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These provide for various commitments, and 
require companies to implement clear and ef-
fective procedures for examining complaints 
regarding hate speech, so that access to such 
content can be withdrawn or disabled within 24 
hours. According to the fourth evaluation of the 
application of this code in February 2019, its 
implementation had succeeded in eliminating 
70% of content identified as being hate speech. 
Google has allegedly tried to control the ma-
nipulation of forums and the use of hate speech 
through Perspective35, an app that detects such 
practices and which can also be used by social 
organisations. There are not many examples of 
case law. Quite noticeably, on 14 January 2020, 
in the case of Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithu-
ania, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled against the State on the basis of discrimi-
nation, violation of family and private life, and 
lack of access to effective remedies, for failure 
to properly act or investigate homophobic hate 
speech on Facebook against an LGTBI activist.
Forensic and legal considerations
We have described situations in which a state 
causes or does not prevent nor put a stop to 
the intentional infliction of severe psychologi-
cal suffering of a citizen to achieve coercion, 
humiliation or punishment without the need 
to resort to physical violence. How this suffer-
ing is distinct from those of traditional torture 
is a largely unexplored field. Medical and psy-
chological research must support legal efforts 
to regulate these complex and multifaceted 
situations. 
Online ill-treatment and torture must be 
recognised and acknowledged. The revelations 





practice of surveillance of citizens led to no 
consequences for the authorities implicated 
other than scandal for and prosecution of the 
whistleblower. According to some scholars, 
paradoxically, competition for citizen surveil-
lance has in fact increased (Richards, 2019). 
The letters to the governments of the United 
States, United Kingdom, Ecuador and Sweden 
by Special Rapporteur Nils Meltzer regarding 
Julian Assange in 2019, showing forensic ev-
idence of torture, was a landmark document 
that opened a path for recognition of ICIT36.
There is a delicate line between freedom 
of expression and hate conduct, and public 
harassment that needs legal clarification. In-
ternational legislation related to ICIT should 
consider protection measures, removal of 
harmful content in internet, as well as forms 
of restoration, rehabilitation, satisfaction as-
surances of non-recurrence, combining mea-
sures that are symbolic, material, individual 
and collective. 
There is also a need for international reg-
ulations that force internet intermediary com-
panies to guarantee data security and privacy, 
regulate and control companies selling spyware 
and hardware and software aimed to infiltra-
tion, surveillance and massive control of pop-
ulation. Similar to support for the control of 
international trade of weapons potentially 
usable as torture devices, comparable legisla-
tion related to the trade of software and hard-
ware of ICIT-capable devices is also necessary. 
There is additionally a need for clear regu-
lations on government access to private infor-
mation, including cloud storage systems and 
infiltration of personal devices without a judi-
cial order. Anonymity or encryption is a right 































 E D I T O R I A L
restricted by any state. Humanitarian organisa-
tions must also seek greater understanding of 
how data and metadata collected or generated 
by their programs for social, political or hu-
manitarian purposes, can be accessed and used 
by other parties for social control (Pirlot de 
Corbion et al., 2018). Organisations working 
with survivors have an ethical duty through 
the do-no-harm principle to avoid involun-
tarily putting people at risk of internet and 
communications-based torture. 
Finally, a complex challenge for the medical 
field is how to address the specific needs of re-
habilitation of survivors of ICIT, combining, as 
with other situations, therapeutic work in indi-
vidual and collective domains, with a special 
focus on symbolic elements. 
In this issue
Megan Berthold, Peter Polatin, James Lavelle, 
Craig Higson-Smith, Frederick Streets, Caitrin 
Kelly and Richard Mollica develop a Complex 
Care Approach (CCA) for treatment of torture 
victims that integrates medical, psychological, 
psychosocial and existential elements from a 
holistic perspective, and apply it to an hypo-
thetical paradigmatic case. Rouf Khawaja and 
collaborators present a series of 40 cases of male 
victims of sexual torture in India with severe 
urological sequelae in defining the concept 
of  parrilla torture  and showing the interplay 
between medical and psychological sequels.   
Carme Vivancos and Iñaki Rivera present data 
from an early analysis of the safeguards in the 
medical examination of people detained in 
Catalonia (Spain) in the framework of civic 
protests. The analysis serves as a reminder that 
the ethical principles of the Istanbul Protocol 
must be respected in all circumstances. Their 
data evidences a request for more thorough in-
vestigation by the Spanish authorities. Sexual 
conversion therapies are still common practice 
in many countries around the world as a recent 
IRCT report has shown. The Independent Fo-
rensic Expert Group has been working over the 
past two years on an analysis of these practices 
as a form of ill-treatment or torture. The reader 
will find a landmark document: the group’s 
latest Statement with the conclusions and rec-
ommendations to the international legal and 
medical communities.
Johan Lansen, one of the great European 
figures of the 20th century in the work with 
torture survivors, from his own experience as 
a Holocaust survivor, passed away in Novem-
ber 2019. Torture Journal reprints, as a posthu-
mous tribute, the article that he published in the 
Journal of Medical Ethics more than 15 years 
ago with personal reflections on the ethical di-
lemmas of working with perpetrators. This is a 
brief but extraordinary contribution that we are 
honoured to rescue.
We are living in times of a global crisis of 
unknown magnitude. The world has had much 
experience of wars in which humans have 
fought against each other. It is the first time 
however in the contemporary age in which the 
world defends itself from a common enemy, 
and when the element that should unite hu-
manity, that difficult to define concept that 
we call the human condition, is globally chal-
lenged. From the Journal we are compiling 
initiatives or situations to provide perspectives 
on the current pandemic and the work with 
torture survivors. You can send us contribu-
tions (papers, reflections, reviews or news). In 
addition, continuing with the regular work of 
the journal throughout this year, three specific 
Special Sections are planned: Physiotherapy in 
the rehabilitation of torture victims, work with 
victims in contexts of active and continuous 
violence, and forced disappearance as a form 
of torture. The Calls for Papers can be found 
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